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Abstract—Technology is changing social attitudes by making
electronic data easy to use and easy to carry, and this capability
impacts data security in business organizations. Therefore, orga-
nizations have to define appropriate controls aimed at preventing
data loss. Having said that, the effectiveness of security controls
in complex dynamic environments has not yet been systematically
analyzed.
In this paper, we propose a formal system model for data
resources in a dynamic environment, which focuses on the location
of different classes of data resources as well as the users. Using
such a model, the concurrent and probabilistic behaviour of
the system can be analyzed. This study provides a systematic
way of exploring the efficiency of a given security policy, or
access control technology, in the business process context. The
proposed approach can help a technical expert to develop a
deeper analysis of the detailed security measures required by
a business organization.
Keywords—data resources, threats, locality, Petri net, informa-
tion security technology, security policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is changing social attitudes by making data
easy to use and easy to carry, and this capability impacts
data security. In business processes, there is a large volume
of data sharing as opposed to more transactional work flow
based processes, and a significant part of the process involves
the handling and managing of highly sensitive data. It has
been identified that the behaviour of users has a significant
impact on information security, and attacks associated with
the inappropriate behaviour of users are on the rise and are
posing a great threat [1][2][3]. Therefore, organizations have
to define sets of security polices and use security technologies
to prevent data loss.
Extensive investment in security polices and information
security technologies can lead to highly complex systems. A
majority of today’s security infrastructure is static, enforcing
policy defined in advance within an environment where IT
infrastructures and business relationships are relatively un-
changed. This no longer sufficient in an environment that
is highly dynamic. Therefore, a major obstacle for effective
implementation of security policies and information security
technologies is that organizations do not have sufficiently
powerful methods to evaluate the potential for, e.g., data loss
and the efficiency of security control in a complex dynamic
environment.
Information security researcher has proposed some meth-
ods for formally addressing the problem of data resource
security. For example, [4][5] used stochastic Petri nets for
quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of the enterprise
information security technologies, using DRM as a case study.
It was found that an important benefit of the implementation
of information security technology system is the reduction of
unauthorized accesses to data resources. However, the previous
study did not consider the mobility of the users, and the expo-
sure of data resources in different locations. In [6], the SCRP
process calculus is proposed to analyse data resources in dif-
ferent locations. The environment in which the system resides
has a stochastic representation using a variety of probability
distributions, and a tool is provided to allow one to animate
the model as a discrete event simulation. This tool can help an
organization to track data resources across different locations.
The resulting methodology has been applied to a number of
security scenarios, including vulnerability management [7],
USB stick usage [8], and identity management [9]. However,
the existing research did not involve user behaviours, and the
status of data resources in different locations. Moreover, the
tool represents an environment in a stochastic way, using a
wide range of probability distributions and queue-like data
structures. This can make it very difficult to analyse the risk
exposure associated with the choice of information security
technologies and policies, as well as the ways in which
the threat environment might exploit different levels of risk
exposure.
The primary objective of this paper is to analyse data
resources in dynamic environment. It will focus on the location
of data resources and the location of users, as well as security
polices in an organization.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the status of data resources in a business organization. A
dynamic data resource system is introduced in Section III,
and an example is presented to show how the dynamic and
concurrent behaviour of the system can be represented. The
probabilistic behaviour of system is discussed in Section V.
Section VI presents concluding remarks.
II. DATA RESOURCES IN AN ORGANIZATION
Figure 1 illustrates the way in which users handle the
data owned by an organization. They store sensitive data on
their desktop PCs, smart phones or USB sticks. When such a
device is lost, the organization is unable to exert any control
on the information stored on this device. In addition, users
can occasionally send email messages that contain confidential
files as attachments without noticing that the files should not
be distributed, or that the recipient should not see the files,
or that an unintended recipient has been incorrectly selected
to receive the email. Each of these behaviours can cause the
digital information to leak outside the company.
Fig. 1. Users access data through different devices and in different locations.
Information security technologies1 have been developed
to address these concerns. In [10], the authors survey the
existing enterprise technologies that control access to confi-
dential digital data (e.g., USB access control solutions, digital
rights management software, and disk encryption techniques).
The researched technologies use endpoint access control as
a means of limiting the maintenance overhead introduced by
unauthorized devices. They also provide auditing options and
prevent outsider access through encryption, which can reduce
the loss or leaking of data. It has been found that the various
information security measures are reliant on the cooperation
of various people and system components, and it has been
identified that the effect of the information technologies highly
depends on the user behaviour.
A. Threats
In business processes there are various types of threats that
could occur and lead to the loss or leaking of data. Different
threats have different probability of occurring; in particular,
there are two important factors in this respect: accidental loss,
and information theft targeted by criminals. An accidental
loss may be somewhat quantifiable particularly as it is related
to physical devices such as laptops or smart phones. The
targeting of information by criminals will depend both on the
individuals with the capability to access data and their capacity
for criminal behaviour, as well as an opportunity to perform
the crime. Factors driving both accidental loss and crime will
be changeable over time and hence it becomes important to
consider the decisions within in a wide range of threat contexts.
Information resources are subject to many kinds of threat. Here
we first need to define the threats for our study. Note that, in
general, a threat is a natural disaster, an unintentional act by an
individual that causes harm, or a malicious act by an individual
or group of individuals [11], [12].
Figure 2 shows the conditions causing threats which re-
sult from the interaction between data resources and user
1We refer to these information security technologies as access control
solutions or identity and access management technologies.
Fig. 2. User behaviour impacts on the security of data resources.
behaviours. Here, and later in the paper, it is assumed that D is
the set of data resources in an organization, and d is a specific
element in D. U is the set of all users whose behaviours could
be applied to D, and u is a specific element in U . The users
fall into two categories, namely users with desired behaviour,
udb ∈ UDB , and users with undesired behaviour, uub ∈ UUB ,
i.e., U = UDB unionmulti UUB .
The set of threats including unintentional acts by users
that cause harm (e.g., device loss, and miss-sent messages) is
denoted by TS, and ts is a specific threat in TS. In Figure 2,
a threat results from an undesired user behaviour applied to a
data resource. Therefore, we have:
TS = D×UUD .
Moreover, a controlled data resource results from a desired
user behaviour applied to a data resource. Therefore, we have:
CD = D×UDB .
In what follows, we will refine the definition of TS and CD,
after taking into account the impact of potential data protection
measures adopted by an organization.
Fig. 3. Security policy impacts on the security of data resources. The
conditions causing threats result from the combination of unprotected data
resources and undesired user behaviour.
B. Data Resources Protection Polices
A data resources protection domain consists of all the
elements of an organization that are subject to the same
data resources protection policy. One can identify various
information security technologies preventing outsider access
to data resources through access control [10]. Therefore, we
consider that there are two categories of data resulting from the
implementation of information security technologies: protected
data, dp ∈ Dp, and unprotected data, dup ∈ Dup, i.e.,
D = Dp unionmultiDup.
The interplay of a data protection policy implemented by
an organization with the behaviour of the users is illustrated in
Figure 3. It shows some regions resulting from the combination
of the protected and unprotected data resources with the
desired and undesired user behaviours. The regions correspond
to the situations listed in Table I. Looking at Figure 3, it
is clear that by minimizing the region resulting from an
interaction between unprotected data resources and undesired
user behaviours, one can reduce the threats in the system.
TABLE I. THE INTERPLAY OF SECURITY POLICY WITH THE
BEHAVIOUR OF USERS
secure Dp×UDB protected data & desired behaviour
controlled1 Dup×UDB unprotected data & desired behaviour
controlled2 Dp×UUD protected data & undesired behaviour
threat Dup×UUD unprotected data & undesired behaviour
After taking into account the implemented information
security technologies protecting data resources, we can intro-
duce secure data SD as a combination of protected data and
users with desired behaviour, and then refine the threat model
presented in Section II-A, in the following way:
TSdrp = Dup × UUD
SDdrp = Dp × UDB
CDdrp = (Dup × UDB) unionmulti (Dp × UUD)
(1)
C. Threat Environment
A threat environment generates threat events that may
cause, e.g., a data loss incident. There are several potential
threats that could occur and lead to security incidents involving
data, each of which would normally have a different probability
of occurring in different environments. Crucially, the same
incident may bring a different impact to the organization
in a different location. For example, a laptop might be left
unattended in a public place allowing passers-by to read a
confidential email, whereas a laptop left unattended in a private
place might not result in any damage to the organization.
To model different threat environments in the system, we
will use a set Loc of locations, with loc ∈ Loc being a specific
location. After that the threat model defined in (1) can be
further refined to take into account different environments, in
the following way:
TSenv = TSdrp × Loc
SDenv = SDdrp × Loc
CDenv = CDdrp × Loc .
(2)
Thus, for instance, TSenv = Dup × UUD × Loc.
D. Status of the Data Resources
We consider each threat can lead to an incident [11]. In the
model of data resources we are developing, we will identify
security incidents with all system events in which a user
exhibiting an undesired behaviour accessed unprotected data.
We will use a special set I to record such events. In addition to
that, we will use special sets, SEC and CON , to respectively
record events in which data resources were accessed in a secure
and controlled manner. We will therefore have:
I ⊆ D × Loc
SEC ⊆ D × Loc
CON ⊆ D × Loc
(3)
where the set of incidents, secure data accesses, and controlled
data accesses are represented together with the locations at
which they occurred. Note that the above definition could
be extended to include other relevant information, e.g., the
security level of data resource, or by allowing I, SEC,CON
to be multisets (as in the rest of this paper).
E. Information Lattices
A lattice for security concerns L = (L,≤) consists of a
set L and a partial order relation ≤ such that, for all l, l′ ∈ L,
there exists a least upper bound l⊕ l′ ∈ L and a greatest lower
bound l ⊗ l′ ∈ L. The lattice is complete if each subset L′
of L has both a least upper bound
∐
L′ and a greatest lower
bound
∏
L′ [13][14].
We will assign a security (or confidentiality) level l ∈ Lsec
to each data item which will in practice be related to the degree
of security of its contents. Moreover, each each location loc ∈
Loc has a security level l(loc) ∈ Lsec , and l(loc) specifies the
highest allowed security level of the data resources located in
loc.
In the next section, we will put together into a single
definition the various notions and notations described so far
separately.
Fig. 4. Data resources in a dynamic environment. Note that the dashed lines
indicate that the joined circles represent the same place.
III. DATA RESOURCES IN DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT
The Petri net in Figure 4 models a dynamic data resources
system. There is one user and one data resource in location
loc1. The user can enter in location loc2, and then move
to location loc3. The data, e.g., can enter in location loc2,
and then move back to loc1. Note that the user and data are
represented by ‘black’ tokens for simplicity. In fact, they are
‘coloured’ tokens with associated attributes, such as security
levels.
In facilitate the discussion, the net of Figure 4 is decom-
posed into three parts: static data resources sub-systems, data
flow and user flow. The static data resources sub-systems show
the interaction between users and data at individual locations,
and the data/user flows show the movement of the data/users
between different locations.
We now ready to introduce a framework for the modelling
of data resources in a dynamic environment.
Definition 1 (ddrs): A dynamic data resource system for
security analysis is a tuple:
DDRS = (D,U,Lsec, Loc,A, sinit) (4)
where:
- D = Dp unionmulti Dup is a finite non-empty set of data
resources;
- U = UDB unionmulti UUD is a finite non-empty set of users;
- Lsec = (L,≤) is a complete security lattice;
- Loc is a finite non-empty set of locations such that
each location loc ∈ Loc has a security level lloc;
- A is a finite set of actions partitioned into three sets,
A = Asdrs unionmulti Adf unionmulti Auf , each action being a pair
φ = (φin, φout)
of finite multisets over the set
C = U × Loc ∪
D × L× Loc ∪
{i, sec, con} ×D × Loc ;
- sinit is an initial state defined as a finite multiset over
the set of tuples C.
In general, a state of DDRS is a finite multiset over the set
of tuples C. ♦
Note that the tags {i, sec, con} are used to indicate the
(multi)sets I, SEC,CON discussed in Section II-D.
A data resource can have several copies, and each of these
copies can have a different security level and may reside in a
different location. We further allow multiple copies of a single
data to be present in a single location. As a result, a state is a
multiset s over the set C rather than a subset of C. Thus, for
example, if s(d, 2, loc) = 4 then we know that in the current
state there are 4 copies of data d with security level 2 residing
at location loc. We will also say that (d, l, loc) is present in
state s if s(d, l, loc) > 0. If s(u, loc) = 3, then we interpret
this as saying that there are 3 users with the behaviour u at
location loc.
The decomposition of the Petri net of Figure 4 into three
sub-models is reflected in the above definition by three types
of actions: Asdrs for the static data resources sub-systems,
Adf for the data flow, and Auf for the user flow. They will be
presented in detail later on. First we define how the system can
execute actions. In fact, one can execute actions one-by-one,
or in groups of multisets.
Definition 2 (single action executions): An action φ =
(φin, φout) is enabled at state s if φin ≤ s, i.e., if the whole
of φin is included in s. Such an action can then be executed
leading to a new state s′ given by:
s′ = s− φin + φout ,
where (−) and (+) are multiset subtraction and addition,
respectively.
We denote this by s
φ−→ s′. ♦
Note that the class of allowed action types may easily be
extended to include, for example, checking for the absence of
certain kinds of data.
Definition 3: (multiset actions execution). A multiset of
actions Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn} is enabled at state s if Φin ≤ s,
where
Φin = φin1 + . . .+ φ
in
n .
Such an action multiset can then be executed leading to a new
state s′ given by:
s′ = s− Φin + Φout ,
where
Φout = φout1 + . . .+ φ
out
n .
We denote this by s Φ−→ s′. ♦
With such a definition we can define precisely what are the
states which can be reached from the initial one.
Definition 4: (reachable states). The set of reachable states
of the dynamic data resource system of Definition 1 is the
minimal set of states RS containing the initial state sinit and
such that if s ∈ RS and s Φ−→ s′, for some Φ, then s′ ∈ RS.
♦
The above framework is still not practical, as it allows too
general a form of the actions in the set A. We will now address
this, by introducing specific forms of the actions in the sets
Asdrs, Adf and Auf .
A. Static Data Resources Sub-systems
Fig. 5. Basic structure of the data resources sub-system at location loc. There
are two users, u1 and u2, and two data resources, d1 and d2.
Figure 5 shows the structure a data resources sub-system (a
central component of our model), representing the behaviour
of the users and data in a single location.
The set actions Asdrs is made up of four distinct kinds of
actions:
Asdrs = A(i)sdrs unionmulti A(sec)sdrs unionmulti A(con)sdrs unionmulti A(data)sdrs ,
defined in the following way (note that a term of the form
(x, . . . , y)@loc denotes a tuple (x, . . . , y, loc)):
- Each φ = (φin, φout) ∈ A(i)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout = {u@loc, (i, d)@loc}
where u ∈ UUD, d ∈ Dup, l ∈ L and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each φ = (φin, φout) ∈ A(sec)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout =
{
u@loc, (sec, d)@loc,
(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dm, lm)@loc
}
where u ∈ UDB , d ∈ Dp, l, l1, . . . , lm ∈ L,
d1, . . . , dm ∈ D, and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each action φ = (φin, φout) ∈ A(con)sdrs is such that
φin = {u@loc, (d, l)@loc}
φout =
{
u@loc, (con, d)@loc,
(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dm, lm)@loc
}
where u ∈ UDB ∧ d ∈ Dup or u ∈ UUD ∧ d ∈ Dp,
l, l1, . . . , lm ∈ L, d1, . . . , dm ∈ D, and loc ∈ Loc.
- Each action φ = (φin, φout) ∈ A(data)sdrs is such that
φin = {(d1, l1)@loc, . . . , (dk, lk)@loc}
φout = {(d′1, l′1)@loc, . . . , (d′m, l′m)@loc} ,
where loc ∈ Loc, d1, . . . , dk, d′1, . . . , d′m ∈ D, and
l1, . . . , lk, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
m ∈ L.
In the above, we assumed for simplicity that the only faulty
behaviour (incident) is data loss, and that a user can only
access a single data resource at a time.
Next we consider the dynamic movement of data resources
and users.
B. Data Flow
Data flow security is concerned with the way in which
secure information is allowed to flow through a computing
system. Intuitively, the flow is considered secure if it adheres
to a specified security policy.
We will now specify what is an allowed action in the set
Adf . Each action φ = (φin, φout) ∈ Adf is such that
φin = {(d1, l1)@loc1, . . . , (dk, lk)@lock}
φout = {(d′1, l′1)@loc′1, . . . , (d′m, l′m)@loc′m} ,
where loc1, . . . , lock, loc′1, . . . , loc
′
m ∈ Loc, d1, . . . , dk,
d′1, . . . , d
′
m ∈ D, and l1, . . . , lk, l′1, . . . , l′m ∈ L.
C. User Flow
The last type of actions concerns the movement of users
between locations. Each action φ = (φin, φout) ∈ Auf is such
that
φin = {u@loc}
φout = {u′@loc′} ,
where u, u′ ∈ U and loc, loc′ ∈ Loc. Note that it may happen
that u 6= u′ if the user changes the behaviour status when
moving from one location to another.
Note, finally, that in practice the actions of the system
can be specified in more convenient way, for example, by
using guards and parameters. This is illustrated in the Petri
net representations where transitions use guards and arcs are
labelled by parameters (variables).
D. System security
We have defined general notions related to the syntax
and operational semantics of a dynamic data resource system
model. It allows one capture the basic notion of security across
the different locations.
Definition 5: Let DDRS be a dynamic data resource sys-
tem model as in (4). A state s of DDRS is secure if, for every
(d, l)@loc present in s, l ≤sec lloc. Moreover, DDRS is secure
if all its reachable states are secure. ♦
That is, a state is secure if all copies of entities present
in the state reside in different locations without causing se-
curity violation. One can formulate a general security policy
guaranteeing the security of data flow model. Such a policy is
formulated by placing a suitable condition on the actions of
the model.
Theorem 3.1: Let DDRS be a dynamic data resource
system model as in (4) such that the following hold:
- For every action φ ∈ A(sec)sdrs ∪A(con)sdrs , we have:∐
{l1, . . . , lm} ≤sec l .
- For every action φ ∈ A(data)sdrs , we have:∐
{l′1, . . . , l′m} ≤sec
∏
{l1, . . . , lk} .
- For every action φ ∈ Adf , we have:
{loc′1, . . . , loc′m} ⊆ {loc1, . . . , lock}
and, for every loc ∈ {loc′1, . . . , loc′m}, we have:∐
{l′i | loc′i = loc} ≤sec
∏
{lj | locj = loc} .
Then DDRS is secure provided that sinit is secure. ♦
The above result can only be applied in specific cases; in
general, we need to verify that a given system specification
yields a secure system (e.g., by applying a suitable model
checking techniques).
Fig. 6. A Petri net model of the example system consisting of two users, two data resources, and three locations.
IV. AN EXAMPLE
We will now present an example to illustrate the structure
and behaviour of a dynamic data resource system. We assume
that two employees, A and B, are on a business trip. Moreover,
there are two data resources, d1 ∈ Dp and d2 ∈ Dup, which
they need to use on the trip, and these data resources are kept
on two mobile devices.
The employees need to travel between three different
locations during the trip, loc1, loc2 and loc3, and use the
data when they need them. We assume that the behaviour
of employee A is captured by u1 ∈ UUD in loc1, and by
u2 ∈ UDB in loc2 and loc3. On the other hand, the behaviour
of employee B is captured by u2 in all three locations.
It is assumed that there security levels l1, l2, l3 with the
ordering l1 ≤ l2 ≤ l3 and that:
- the security level of two data resources is l2; and
- the security levels of the three locations are as follows:
lloc1 = lloc2 = l2 and lloc3 = l1.
The structure and dynamics (possible actions) of the ex-
ample system are represented by the Petri net in Figure 6. The
diagram also shows the initial state of the system.
The two employees are represented by two tokens in a
place labelled loc1, one token being u1 (for employee A) and
the other u2 (for employee B). The leftmost sub-net shows
how the users can move between different locations (e.g., it is
not possible to move directly from loc1 to loc3, but one can
achieve this through an intermediate move to loc2).
The data resources are represented by the two tokens in a
different place labelled loc1. It follows from the security levels
of the data resources and locations, that data resources can
never enter loc3. Note that the security policy is represented by
the guard l ≤ l3 associated with the only transition incoming
to the bottom place (labelled loc3) in the middle sub-net.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 depict three reachable states of the
example system:
- Figure 7: (i) the undesired behaviour of A at loc1,
combined with the unprotected status of d2, has led
to an incident in which d2 is lost; (ii) the undesired
behaviour of A at loc1, combined with the protected
status of d1, has led to a controlled interaction; and
(iii) the desired behaviour of B at loc1, combined
with the protected status of d1, has led to a secure
interaction.
- Figure 8: the desired behaviour of A and B at loc2,
combined with the protected status of d1, has led to
secure interactions.
- Figure 9: both A and B can move to loc3, but d1
is prevented from doing so by the security policy as
discussed above. As a result, the employees cannot
interact with d1 in this location.
V. PROBABILISTIC BEHAVIOUR
When the users or data resources move from one location
to another, they movements might follow probabilistic distri-
bution. In the above example, users in loc2 can move to loc1
or loc3. Also, if a data resource with security level l residing
Fig. 7. A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc1.
Fig. 8. A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc2.
in loc2 conforms to the security policy, i.e., l ≤ lloc2 and
l ≤ lloc3 , the data can move to loc2 or loc3.
Assuming that we know the probability distributions for
choosing the next locations in such a case, it is easy to turn
the Petri net model outlined above into a probabilistic Petri
net which can then be simulated and evaluated using suitable
automated tools.
Fig. 9. A reachable state of the example system with both employees in loc3.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a system model for data resources in a
business organization based on the location of different classes
of data resources as well as the users. In this model, the status
of the data resources are divided into different classes in order
to analyse the existing or planned security policies. We also
illustrated how such system model can be represented by a
Petri net which can then be used to track and analyse the
data resources and users in different locations using suitable
tools and methods. The proposed modelling technique would
help to move the debate from discussion of claims made
by the information security technology vendors to a better
(rigorous) understanding of the effectiveness of information
security technology and security policies.
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